Why Hire a 50 Year Old?

It feels like only yesterday I was a star!

I played first XV rugby and won Scottish Schools Athletics Gold.

I entered University, was elected to the Student Council and graduated with a selection of jobs. I was actually even headhunted when Citibank pulled me away from the initial attractions of SG Warburg.

Today I am 50 years old and am in search of someone who wants to pay for my services. Whether employment or consultancy doesn't matter. I just seek someone who sees value in what I bring.

My career started in 1987. I entered a throbbing dealing room, full to bursting with traders and salespeople. The September arrived and it quickly emptied.

In 1990 I moved to Tokyo just as the economic 'miracle' of Japan was shown to be pretty hollow. For 2 years I helped banks and companies cover up their pain, but Japan's problems were clear.

In 1993 I moved to Hong Kong. A few years of boom then 1997 arrived and the walls came tumbling down.

In 2001 I went out to pursue my own entrepreneurial activities. Yes, the tech bubble was bursting and I saw the pain with my own eyes.

So why should you hire someone who seems to follow disaster? That is exactly the reason.

The world feels dangerous today. Economically, the principle growth driver of China is in deep distress. How do I know? Simple, I dont follow the deep economic analysis or the multiple media commentators....I just speak to people on the ground. The same is happening in SE Asia which is clearly yesterday's story. South America is bust (once again), Europe has so many problems it is not worth listing them and Africa, Australia and Canada are experiencing the challenges of mortgaging their future to China's commodity growth.

I know what can happen here, but I am not valuable just because I am a doom and gloom merchant. Rather I am valuable because I can still identify growth.

Every 'disaster' I have witnessed has generated the most extraordinary business opportunities. Today is no different. China may decline, but Iran is emerging. No, it isn't as big, but it is big enough to provide a boost to all but the largest corporations. I could provide many other examples, but that would be giving the game away!

I find it incredible that more people dont review business and economic history. There isn't much that cant be viewed in the past. China is going through big challenges but didnt the US experience the 1929 crash and the depression of the early 30's?

I can save money and I can make money, I just need money. So hire me, consult me, talk to me and pay me. It doesn't matter whether you are in natural resources or IT or tourism, you will be surprised at my insight and at the very least I will be sure to make you think? However, I'll add clarity to your situation and I'll probably give you some decent ideas.

Of course you could hire a 30 or 40 year old who looks prettier and talks of having a great network and has worked for the big boys. You could hire someone who has enjoyed the luxury of a salary and having a prestigious business card. You could hire someone who thinks that real estate values only go up. You could hire someone who delivers lots of flattery and boosts your ego.

Or you could hire someone like me who will scare you but then build a plan for excitement and success.

I have made my mistakes, I have made big mistakes. I have been jealous and envious but I have savoured my successes.

I look forward to working with you

Cordyceps Special

Anyone reading this will be aware that I am a shareholder in www.3cordyceps.com where I believe we have the most attractive combination of pure Chinese herbs available today.

To celebrate the upcoming Singapore marathon, we have decided to offer a special 30% introductory discount to anyone trying for the first time. However, I can make this available to anyone that reads this, even if you are not participating in the marathon.

Simply enter the code STDC1212 into the appropriate box within the online order form.

Hope that you appreciate them as much as I do.

Madagascar

The recent Presidential elections in Madagascar seem to have been free and fair and took place without violence. This should be on the radar screen of any investor looking at Natural Resources.

Madagascar has amazing reserves of oil,gas, coal, gold, uranium, rare earths etc etc. However, for different reasons but in a similar way to my other country of interest, Iran, these reserves have been underexploited. The political upheaval in the country has not only scared away international investment, but also closed the doors of the Government ministry responsible for granting licenses.

There will likely be a run off in December, but it looks likely that we shall have some political stability in Madagascar for the first time in many years. This is great news for the long suffering population which is now one of the poorest in the world, but also great news for resources investors.

Take notice!!

Have Financial Regulators learned anything?

When 3 shares, all connected by key shareholders, start rising exponentially at the same time, one would imagine that the regulators may sit up and take notice?

When these shares reach enormous valuation levels (PE's of many thousands for example) with limited asset foundation, one would imagine that the regulators would sit up and take notice?

When the 'chatter' amongst financial markets practitioners in bars and restaurants was focused on these shares and how something 'odd' was happening, one would imagine that the regulators would sit up and take notice? 

Of course they didnt! On Friday in Singapore, three shares, Asiasons, Lion Gold and Blumont all started tumbling before they were suspended. This morning upon relisting, they started tumbling again. Now losses in excess of 80% from Thursday's close have been seen. Once again, retail investors have been deserted by the regulators that are supposed to protect them. 

I have no clue whether anything sinister is going on there, but inevitably, some folks have made a lot of money at the cost of others who had less information. 

Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose!! 

stratfor on Iran - Worth Reading

U.S. and Iranian Realities

Geopolitical Weekly

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2013 - 04:00  Print  Text Size 

Stratfor

By George Friedman

U.S. President Barack Obama called Iranian President Hassan Rouhani last week in the first such conversation in the 34 years since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The phone call followed tweets and public statements on both sides indicating a willingness to talk. Though far from an accommodation between the two countries, there are reasons to take this opening seriously -- not only because it is occurring at such a high level, but also because there is now a geopolitical logic to these moves. Many things could go wrong, and given that this is the Middle East, the odds of failure are high. But Iran is weak and the United States is avoiding conflict, and there are worse bases for a deal.

Iran's Surge

Though the Iranians are now in a weak strategic position, they had been on the offensive since 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq. They welcomed the invasion; Saddam Hussein had been a mortal enemy of Iran ever since the 1980-1989 Iran-Iraq War. The destruction of his regime was satisfying in itself, but it also opened the door to a dramatic shift in Iran's national security situation.

Iraq was Iran's primary threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union because it was the only direction from which an attack might come. A pro-Iranian or even neutral Iraq would guarantee Iranian national security. The American invasion created a power vacuum in Iraq that the U.S. Army could not fill. The Iranians anticipated this, supporting pro-Iranian elements among the Shia prior to 2003 and shaping them into significant militias after 2003. With the United States engaged in a war against Sunni insurgents, the Shia, already a majority, moved to fill the void.

The United States came to realize that it was threatened from two directions, and it found itself battling both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. The purpose of the surge in 2007 was to extricate itself from the war with the Sunnis and to block the Shia. It succeeded with the former to a great extent, but it was too late in the game for the latter. As the United States was withdrawing from Iraq, only the Shia (not all of them Iranian surrogates) could fill the political vacuum. Iran thus came to have nothing to fear from Iraq, and could even dominate it. This was a tremendous strategic victory for Iran, which had been defeated by Iraq in 1989.

After the Iranians made the most of having the United States, focused on the Sunnis, open the door for Iran to dominate Iraq, a more ambitious vision emerged in Tehran. With Iraq contained and the United States withdrawing from the region, Saudi Arabia emerged as Iran's major challenger. Tehran now had the pieces in place to challenge Riyadh.

Iran was allied with Syria and had a substantial pro-Iranian force in Lebanon -- namely, Hezbollah. The possibility emerged in the late 2000s of an Iranian sphere of influence extending from western Afghanistan's Shiite communities all the way to the Mediterranean. Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had fairly realistic visions of Iranian power along Saudi Arabia's northern border, completely changing the balance of power in the region.

But while Syrian President Bashar al Assad was prepared to align himself with Iran, he initially had no interest in his country's becoming an Iranian satellite. In fact, he was concerned at the degree of power Iran was developing. The Arab Spring and the uprising against al Assad changed this equation. Before, Syria and Iran were relative equals. Now, al Assad desperately needed Iranian support. This strengthened Tehran's hand, since if Iran saved al Assad, he would emerge weakened and frightened, and Iranian influence would surge.

The Russians also liked the prospect of a strengthened Iran. First, they were fighting Sunnis in the northern Caucasus. They feared the strengthening of radical Sunnis anywhere, but particularly in the larger Sunni-dominated republics in Russia. Second, an Iranian sphere of influence not only would threaten Saudi Arabia, it also would compel the United States to re-engage in the region to protect Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Russians had enjoyed a relatively free hand since 2001 while the Americans remained obsessed with the Islamic world. Creating a strategic crisis for the United States thus suited Moscow's purposes. The Russians, buffered from Iran by the Caucasus states, were not frightened by the Iranians. They were therefore prepared to join Iran in supporting the al Assad regime.

The problem was that al Assad could not impose his will on Syria. He did not fall, but he also couldn't win. A long-term civil war emerged, and while the Iranians had influence among the Alawites, the stalemate undermined any dream of an Iranian sphere of influence reaching the Mediterranean. This became doubly true when Sunni resistance to the Shia in Iraq grew. The Syrian maneuver required a decisive and rapid defeat of the Sunni insurgents in Syria. That didn't happen, and the ability of the Shiite regime of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to resist the Sunnis was no longer guaranteed.

Iranian Ambitions Decline

In 2009, it had appeared extremely likely that an Iran loosely aligned with Russia would enjoy a sphere of influence north of Saudi Arabia. By 2013, this vision was shattered, and with it the more grandiose strategic vision of Ahmadinejad and his allies in Iran. This led to a re-evaluation of Iran's strategic status -- and of the value of its nuclear program.

It was Stratfor's view that Iran had less interest in actually acquiring a nuclear weapon than in having a program to achieve one. Possessing a handful of nuclear weapons would be a worst-case scenario for Iran, as it might compel massive attacks from Israel or the United States that Iran could not counter. But having a program to develop one, and making it credible, gave the Iranians a powerful bargaining chip and diverted U.S. and Israeli attention from the growing Iranian sphere of influence. Ahmadinejad's hope, I think, was to secure this sphere of influence, have the basis for making demands on the Saudis and the Gulf Cooperation Council, and trade the nuclear program for U.S. recognition and respect for the new regional balance. Indeed, while the United States and Israel were obsessed with the Iranian bomb, the Iranians were making major strides in developing more conventional power.

Iran's regional strategy was in shambles, and the international sanctions its nuclear program triggered began to have some significant effect. I am unable to determine whether Iran's economic crisis derived from the sanctions or whether it derived from a combination of the global economic crisis and Iran's own economic weakness. But in the end, the perception that the sanctions had wreaked havoc on the Iranian economy turned the nuclear program, previously useful, into a liability.

Iran found itself in a very difficult position. Internally, opposition to any accommodation with the United States was strong. But so was the sense that Ahmadinejad had brought disaster on Iran strategically and economically. For Iran, the nuclear program became increasingly irrelevant. The country was not going to become a regional power. It now had to go on the defensive, stabilize Iraq and, more important, address its domestic situation.

The U.S. Challenge

There is profound domestic opposition in the United States to dealing with the Iranian regime. Just as the Iranians still genuinely resent the 1953 coup that placed the shah on the throne, the Americans have never forgotten the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and the subsequent yearlong hostage crisis. We must now wait and see what language Iran will craft regarding the hostage crisis to reciprocate the courtesy of Obama's acknowledging the 1953 coup.

The United States is withdrawing from the Middle East to the extent it can. Certainly, it has no interest in another ground war. It has interests in the region, however, and chief among those are avoiding the emergence of a regional hegemon that might destabilize the Middle East. The United States also learned in Iraq that simultaneously fighting Sunnis and Shia pits the United States against forces it cannot defeat without major effort. It needs a way to manage the Islamic world without being in a constant state of war.

The classic solution to this is to maintain a balance of power with minimal force based on pre-existing tensions. A weakened Iran needs support in its fight with the Sunnis. The United States is interested in ensuring that neither the Sunni nor the Shia win -- in other words, in the status quo of centuries. Having Iran crumble internally therefore is not in the American interest, since it would upset the internal balance. While sanctions were of value in blocking Iranian ascendancy, in the current situation stabilizing Iran is of greater interest.

The United States cannot proceed unless the nuclear program is abandoned. Rouhani understands that, but he must have and end to sanctions and a return of Western investment to Iran in exchange. These are doable under the current circumstances. The question of Iranian support for al Assad is not really an issue; the United States does not want to see a Syrian state dominated by radical Sunnis. Neither does Iran. Tehran would like a Syria dominated by al Assad, but Iran realizes that it has played that card and lost. The choices are partition, coalition or war -- neither Iran nor the United States is deeply concerned with which.

Threats to a Resolution

There are two threats to a potential resolution. The primary threat is domestic. In both countries, even talking to each other seems treasonous to some. In Iran, economic problems and exhaustion with grandiosity opens a door. In the United States right now, war is out of the question. And that paves the way to deals unthinkable a few years ago.

A second threat is outside interference. Israel comes to mind, though for Israel, the removal of the nuclear program would give them something they were unable to achieve themselves. The Israelis argued that the Iranian bomb was an existential threat to Israel. But the Israelis lack the military power to deal with it themselves, and they could not force the Americans into action. This is the best deal they can get if they actually feared an Iranian bomb. Though Israel's influence on this negotiation with Iran will face limits with the U.S. administration, Israel will make an effort to insert itself in the process and push its own demands on what constitutes an acceptable Iranian concession.

Saudi Arabia meanwhile will be appalled at a U.S.-Iranian deal. Hostility toward Iran locked the United States into place in support of the Saudis. But the United States is now flush with oil, and Saudi attempts to block reconciliation will not meet a warm reception. The influence of Saudi Arabia in Washington has waned considerably since the Iraq war.

The Russian position will be more interesting. On the surface, the Russians have been effective in Syria. But that's only on the surface. The al Assad regime wasn't bombed, but it remains crippled. And the Syrian crisis revealed a reality the Russians didn't like: If Obama had decided to attack Syria, there was nothing the Russians could have done about it. They have taken a weak hand and played it as cleverly as possible. But it is still a weak hand. The Russians would have liked having the United States bogged down containing Iran's influence, but that isn't going to happen, and the Russians realize that ultimately they lack the weight to make it happen. Syria was a tactical victory for them; Iran would be a strategic defeat.

The Iranian and American realities argue for a settlement. The psyche of both countries is in the balance. There is clearly resistance in both, yet it does not seem strong enough or focused enough to block it. That would seem to indicate speed rather than caution. But of course, getting it done before anyone notices isn't possible. And so much can go wrong here that all of this could become moot. But given how the Iranians and Americans see their positions, the odds are, that something will happen. In my book, The Next Decade, I argued that in the long run Iran and the United States have aligning interests and that an informal alliance is likely in the long run. This isn't the long run yet, and the road will be bumpy, but the logic is there.

Read more: U.S. and Iranian Realities | Stratfor
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Producing Low Cost Hydrogen and Getting Excited about Technology again!

I had a fascinating discussion over recent days with a scientist who has a new approach to farming pure hydrogen from water using electrolysis. This ability to do this has been known for years (decades even) but doing it economically is the problem. This may be the answer.

This post is not designed to explain how he does this but rather to point out the excitement of the opportunities if he is correct.

It is very easy to get bored with technology and fear that 'the next big thing' will never happen. I happen to believe that the advent of an efficient touchscreen was one of these events, but then we look at the updated iPhone 5, compare it against the iPhone 4 and yawn....... We also bemoan the lack of supersonic air travel or a flying backpack......what is genuinely new and exciting around the corner we ask?

This is missing the point though.

Energy lies at the heart of our everyday lives. At a macro level, the impact of energy on Middle Eastern politics is clear, the return of Iran is a big issue I've written about and the advent of shale gas providing energy independence to the US, also has a massive impact on global politics and economics.

Renewable energy is certainly funky, but it is a let down. Solar panels for most only become economic because of government bribes (sorry I should say Feed in Tariffs!) and what happens when it is dark.....

Hydrogen can change this. If we use solar or wind to 'spark' the hydrogen production into life and sustain it to produce hydrogen from water (and not, it shouldn't be distilled, it needs to be saline or brackish for me to become excited), then we have an exciting opportunity not only to reduce the cost of energy, but more importantly to make it available to everyone.

I was reminded about this when speaking with a biodiesel executive from Burkino Faso who explained how expensive imports of carbon fuels are into his country. The spectacular impact of distributed hydrogen powered energy would be fantastic for this country and its population.

It is too early to say whether the scientist I met this week has the answer, but the good news is that scientists like him are still researching. There are more 'Next Big Things' to happen in my lifetime and I feel more confident than ever, that the world in 20 years time is going to be a better place than it is today!

Hemp and Chinese Medicine

Whilst I am a believer in Chinese herbs and particularly in the mix at www.3cordyceps.com , I was intrigued by the discovery of www.basichemp.com

I dont profess to being knowledgeable about hemp, but am definitely prepared to believe that it has values unrelated to its 'druggie' reputation when treated properly. Certainly the use of hemp as a material in clothes etc is well known to me.

However, the key to this in my opinion is the increasing recognition in the so called 'West' of new ingredients that are beneficial to our bodies and the creation of mixes that incorporate traditional Chinese herbs, Ayurvedha and now the likes of hemp.

As the nutraceutical industry expands, we are only going to see more of these combinations, not just in food supplements but also in cosmetics. One key is going to be that we can check the quality and provenance of the ingredients. This will take time, but there are going to be some big winners out there